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Before stage 1, a forecast 𝐹 ∈ ሼ𝐵, 𝐺ሻ of the harvest‐stage state is announced. The harvest stage 











1 െ 𝛾 ൣ𝑐ଵி







𝑄௕ி ൌ min ൬𝑥ଵிఉ ሺ1 െ 𝑅ிሻ,
𝑥௕ி
𝜌  ൰  (2) 
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𝑐ଵி ൌ 𝑌௖ െ 𝑤ଵி𝑥ଵி































𝑐ଵி ൌ 𝐼ሺ𝑚ி ൌ 1ሻ𝑤ଵ௨ ൅ ൫1 െ 𝐼ሺ𝑚ி ൌ 1ሻ൯𝑤ଵி ൅ 𝑌௟  




𝑤ଵ௨~ℱଵሺ𝑤ሻ ൌ 𝑤𝑓ଵ,  (5) 
where 𝑓ଵ is a positive constant. The urban wage offers drawn for the harvest stage are drawn 
from (uniform) distributions that depend on the planting stage residence of the worker: 
𝑤ଶ௨~𝐼ሺ𝑚ி ൌ 1ሻℱଶሺ𝑤ሻ ൅ ൫1 െ 𝐼ሺ𝑚ி ൌ 1ሻ൯ℱଵሺ𝑤ሻ.  (6) 
We assume that a worker is more likely to attract a better urban wage offer if the worker is 































൫𝑤ଵி, 𝑤௚ி, 𝑤௕ி൯ ≡ 𝑤ி  such that  
𝑆ଵிሺ𝑤ிሻ ൌ 𝑥ଵிሺ𝑤ிሻ
𝑆ଵℱଵሺ𝑤௕ிሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑆ଵሻℱଶሺ𝑤௕ிሻ ൌ 𝜌𝑥௕ሺ𝑥ଵிሺ𝑤ிሻሻ 


















min ൞1, ቆ𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏ሺ𝑠 ൌ 𝑔|𝐹ሻ𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏ሺ𝑠 ൌ 𝑏|𝐹ሻቇ
ଵ
ఊ ቆ𝜃൫1 െ 𝜌𝑤௚ி൯ሺ1 െ 𝜌𝑤௕ிሻ ቇ
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portfolio is greater after a forecast of good weather than after a forecast of bad weather ሺ𝑅ீ ൐ 𝑅஻ሻ.  
That is 








of the model when  𝛾 ൏ 1.  
 First, planting stage labor demand is higher after a forecast of good rain than after a forecast of 
bad rain: 








































wage (𝑤௠ሻ and on the forecast F by a vector of wages ൫𝑤ଵி, 𝑤௚ி, 𝑤௕ி൯ ≡ 𝑤ி  such that 𝑤ி ൒ 𝑤௠ and 
𝑆ଵிሺ𝑤ிሻ ൒ 𝑥ଵிሺ𝑤ிሻ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝑤ଵி ൐ 𝑤௠
𝑆ଵℱଵሺ𝑤௕ிሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑆ଵሻℱଶሺ𝑤௕ிሻ ൒ 𝜌𝑥௕ሺ𝑥ଵிሺ𝑤ிሻሻ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝑤௕ி ൐ 𝑤௠





Proposition 2: Suppose that the equilibrium wage vector is ൫𝑤ଵி∗ , 𝑤௚ி∗ , 𝑤௕ி∗ ൯ ≡ 𝑤ி∗  such that 























exist parameters such that 𝑤ଵி െ 𝑤ଵி∗ ൅ ൫𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏ሺ𝑠 ൌ 𝑔|𝐹ሻ൯ሺ𝑤௚ி െ 𝑤௚ி∗ ሻ ൅ ൫1 െ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏ሺ𝑠 ൌ 𝑏|𝐹ሻ൯ሺ𝑤௕ி െ













































































































































































ln 𝑥௜௝௧ ൌ 𝛽ଵ𝐹௝௧ ൅ 𝛽ଶ𝐹௝௧ ∗ 𝑞௝ ൅ 𝐹௝௧∑𝛽ௗ𝑍௝ௗ ൅ 𝜆௜௝ ൅ 𝜉௜௝௧,  (17) 
where  ijtx  = the log of the real rupee value of planting‐stage investments for farmer i in area j at time t; 
jtF  = the forecast at time t in area j, measured as a percent of 100 (normal);  jq  = forecast skill in area j 
(average correlation between rainfall and the forecast across the REDS sample villages in the district, 
with jq  set to zero for district in which the correlation is negative or zero ); the  jdZ  = the area specific 









































































































statutory minimum wage associated with NREGA in area j at time t;  ij  = worker fixed effect; and  ijt  = 














































































































𝑦௜௝௧ ൌ 𝜋ଵ𝐹௝௧ ൅ 𝜋ଶ𝜔௝௧ ൅ 𝜋ଷ𝑟௝௧ ൅ 𝜋ସ𝐹௝௧𝜔௝௧ ൅ 𝜋ହ𝐹௝௧𝑟௝௧ ൅ 𝜆௜௝ ൅ 𝜉௜௝௧,  (20) 
where 𝑦௜௝௧ ൌ 1 if a male worker i aged 19‐49 residing in area j is in located outside the village in year t in 
the months of September and October or the log of the real daily wage in those months; 𝐹௜௝௧ ൌ 1 if the 
forecast at time t in area j is below 98 (low rainfall);  𝜔௝௧= the real statutory minimum wage associated 
with NREGA in area j at time t; rjt = rainfall in the months of July through September; ij  = worker fixed 
effect; and  ijt  = iid error. The model predicts that for migration𝜋ଵ ൐ 0, 𝜋ଶ, 𝜋ଷ ൏ 0, 𝜋ସ, 𝜋ହ ൐ 0. For 

























































































































































































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Figure 2. Proportion of Rural Workers in Urban Areas Among Men Aged 19-49,
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Away at least 5 days
Away at least 1 day
Figure 3. Proportion of Rural Workers Away from Home Among Men Aged 19-49,
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Figure 4. Proportion of Workers Among Men Aged 19-49 in Urban Areas in July,

































































Figure 5: Lowess-Smoothed Relationship between Inter-Village Distance (Km)
and June-August Rainfall Correlation, Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh 1999-2007
Table 1













Forecast Skill and Rainfall Characteristics, Six Original ICRISAT Villages 2005-2011,
by Village
State Maharashtra Andhra Pradesh
Village Kalman Kanzara Kinkheda Shirapur Aurepalle Dokur
Mean July-September rainfall
(mm)
415.8 582.5 571.1 360.9 586.4 525.4
CV July-September rainfall .753 .750 .736 .741 .488 .213
Skill (forecast-rainfall ñ)
 
.451 .173 .193 .397 -.401 -.161
Table 3
































































N 97 97 39
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4
Farmer Fixed-Effect Estimates of the Effect of the IMD Forecast
on Planted HYV Acreage: ARIS 1969-71
Variable
All Farmers
Farmers Where There are
Forecasts





Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Specification contains a linear trend. 
Table 5
Farmer Fixed-Effect Estimates of the Effects of the IMD Forecast and Forecast Skill



















H0: Rainfall, rice and bank





H0: Soil interactions = 0, F(4,208)  
                            [p]
- - 1.09
[0.3646]
H0: Rainfall, rice, bank and soil 
interactions = 0, F(8,208)    [p]
- - 1.45
[0.1792]
N 4,438 4,438 4,438
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. q=district-average of the correlations of
IMD forecasts with village-level rainfall in the 242 ARIS/REDS villages, 1999-2006. All specifications
include survey year.
Table 6
Farmer Fixed-Effect Estimates of the IMD Forecast Effect
on Kh arif-Season Log Planting-Stage Investment
ICRISAT Villages, 2009-2014
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Forecast    0.0245***
(0.00513)
   0.0322***
(0.00574)
- -
Forecast x no skill village -    -0.0257***
(0.0124)
- -




Forecast<98 x no skill village - - - 0.137*
(0.0787)
N 3,403 3,403 3,403 3,403
Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a linear trend variable.
Table 7
Farmer Fixed-Effect Estimates of Rainfall and the IMD Forecast Effects
on Kh arif-Season Farm Profits: ICRISAT Villages, 2009-2014
Variable (1) (2)
Total village rainfall (mm) in Kharif season      88.1***
(12.2)
     98.0***
(13.2)




Forecast<98 x rainfall - 10.3
(7.35)
Forecast<98 x rainfall squared -  -0.0137**
(0.00710)
(a) dð/dRain with good forecast at mean rainfall: -   36.6***
(5.68)
(b) dð/dRain with bad forecast at mean rainfall: -   28.5***
(5.51)




Household Fixed-Effect Estimates of the IMD Forecast and Minimum Wage Effects
 on Kh arif-Season Planting-Stage Migration by Rural Men Aged 19-49
ICRISAT Villages, 2009-2014
Year/area (1) (2)
Forecast<98   0.0235***
(0.00514)
   0.184***
(0.0745)




Forecast<98 x minimum wage -   -0.00165***
(0.000759)
N 8,025 8,025
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the household level. Specification also includes the age and
age squared of the respondent.
Table 9
District Fixed-Effect Estimates of the IMD Forecast and Minimum Wage Effects
 on Kh arif-Season Planting-Stage Migration by Rural Men Aged 14-49
NSS Rounds 62,63,64, and 66 ARIS/REDS Districts
Year/area (1) (2)












Forecast<98 x minimum wage - 0.998
(0.628)
Forecast<98 x minimum wage x q - -45.4***
(3.946)
N 3,907 3,907
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the household level. Specification also includes the age and
age squared, schooling and total owned land of the respondent and the mean rainfall and standard
deviation of rainfall in the sampling unit. q=district-average of the correlations of IMD forecasts with
village-level rainfall in the 242 ARIS/REDS villages, 1999-2006.
Table 10
Household Fixed-Effect Estimates of the IMD Forecast and Minimum Wage Effects
 on Kh arif-Season Planting-Stage Log Wages for Men Aged 19-49
ICRISAT Villages, 2009-2014
Year/area (1) (2)
Forecast<98       0.0569***
(0.0199)
     1.514***
(0.244)
Real minimum wage 0.00239**
(0.00143)
   0.0112***
(0.00199)
Forecast<98 x minimum wage -   -0.0149***
(0.00244)
N 5,139 5,139
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the household level. Specification also includes the age and
age squared of the respondent.
Table 11
District Fixed-Effect Estimates of the IMD Forecast and Minimum Wage Effects
 on Kh arif-Season Planting-Stage Log Wages for Rural Wage Workers Aged 19-49






Forecast<98 x q 0.593
(0.646)
     7.675***
(3.382)




Forecast<98 x minimum wage - 4.126
(4.777)
Forecast<98 x minimum wage x q -     -35.24***
(15.37)
N 3,023 3,023
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the household level. Specification also includes the age and
age squared, schooling, and gender of the respondent and the mean rainfall and standard deviation of
rainfall in the sampling unit. q=district-average of the correlations of IMD forecasts with village-level
rainfall in the 242 ARIS/REDS villages, 1999-2006, where positive.
Table 12
Household Fixed-Effect Estimates of the IMD Forecast and Minimum Wage Effects
 on Kh arif-Season Harvest-Stage Migration for Men Aged 19-49
ICRISAT Villages, 2009-2014
Year/area (1) (2)
Village rainfall (mm) -0.00000201
(0.00006)
     -0.0000669**
(0.0000349)
Forecast<98     0.0163***
(0.00422)
     0.203***
(0.0809)




Forecast<98 x rain - -0.0000685**
(0.0000365)
Minimum wage x rain -    -0.00000155***
(0.000000641)
Forecast<98 x minimum wage -    -0.00166***
(0.000761)
N 9,621 9,621
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the household level. Specification also includes the age and
age squared of the respondent.
Table 13
Household Fixed-Effect Estimates of the IMD Forecast and Minimum Wage Effects
 on Kh arif-Season Harvest-Stage Log Wages for Men Aged 19-49
ICRISAT Villages, 2009-2014
Year/area (1) (2)
Village rainfall (mm)    0.000660***
(0.0000861)
    0.00346***
(0.000759)
Forecast<98      0.0567***
(0.0211)
     1.99***
(0.301)
Real minimum wage       0.00493***
(0.00135)
   0.0238***
(0.00218)
Forecast<98 x rain -   -0.000441***
(0.000123)
Minimum wage x rain -    -0.0000343***
(0.00000784)
Forecast<98 x minimum wage - -0.0186***
(0.00283)
N 6,007 6,007
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the household level. Specification also includes the age and







The model with if 𝐹 ൌ 𝐺 with 𝑞 ൌ 𝑞଴ is indistinguishable from that with 𝐹 ൌ 𝐵 and 𝑞ଵ ൌ 1 െ 𝑞଴. 





   𝛽𝑥ଵீఉିଵൣሺ1 െ 𝑞ሻሺ1 െ 𝜌𝑤௕ீሻሺ1 െ 𝑅ீሻ𝑐௕ீିఊ ൅ 𝑞ሺ1 ൅ 𝑅ீሻሺ1 െ 𝜌𝑤௚ீሻ𝜃𝑐௚ீିఊ൧ െ 𝑤ଵீ𝑐ଵீିఊ
ൌ 0 
(22) 





ሺ1 െ 𝜌𝑤௕ீሻሺ1 െ 𝑞ሻ







ሺ1 െ 𝜌𝑤௕ீሻሺ1 െ 𝑅ீሻ



















ቆ 1 െ 𝜌𝑤௕ீ𝜃൫1 െ 𝜌𝑤௚ீ൯ቇ
ଵ










ቆ 1 െ 𝜌𝑤௕ீ𝜃൫1 െ 𝜌𝑤௚ீ൯ቇ
ଵ






































  𝛽𝑥ଵீఉିଵ ቈሺ1 െ 𝑞ሻሺ1 െ 𝜌𝑤௕ீሻሺ1 െ 𝑅ீሻ  
ሺ1 െ 𝜌𝑤௚ீሻ𝑞𝜃
ሺ1 െ 𝜌𝑤௕ீሻሺ1 െ 𝑞ሻ






2𝛽𝑥ଵீఉିଵ𝑞ሺ1 െ 𝜌𝑤௚ீሻ𝜃 ൌ 𝑤ଵீ ൭
𝑌 െ 𝑤ଵ𝑥ଵீ







ሺ𝑌 െ 𝑤ଵ𝑥ଵீሻିఊ𝑤ଵீሺ1 ൅ 𝑅ீሻఊ൫1 െ 𝜌𝑤௚ீ൯ఊିଵ𝜃ఊିଵ
2𝛽𝑞 ൌ 0  (29) 
implicitly defines x. Define the LHS of (28) as 𝐺௫. Noting that 
  𝜕𝐺௫
𝜕𝑥 ൌ ሺ𝛽 െ 1 െ 𝛽𝛾ሻ𝑥ଵீ
ఉିଶିఉఊ െ 𝛾𝑤ଵ𝑐ଵீ













𝜕𝑤௚ீ ൌ ሺ𝛾 െ 1ሻ𝜌
ሺ𝑌 െ 𝑤ଵ𝑥ଵீሻିఊ𝑤ଵீሺ1 ൅ 𝑅ீሻఊ൫1 െ 𝜌𝑤௚ீ൯ఊିଶ𝜃ఊିଵ











ሺ𝑌 െ 𝑤ଵ𝑥ଵீሻିఊ𝑤ଵீ൫1 െ 𝜌𝑤௚ீ൯ఊିଵ𝜃ఊିଵ
2𝛽𝑞ଶ ൤ሺ1 ൅ 𝑅ீሻ
ఊ
െ 𝑞𝛾ሺ1 ൅ 𝑅ீሻఊିଵ 𝜕𝑅ீ𝜕𝑞 ൨ 
(32) 











  𝑊: 𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ீ∗ ሻ ൅ 𝑞ൣ𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଶ𝑣൫𝑤௚ீ൯ ൅ ൫1 െ 𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଶ൯𝐸൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯൧
൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑞ሻሾ𝑤௕ீ𝑓ଶ𝑣ሺ𝑤௕ீሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑤௕ீ𝑓ଶሻ𝐸ଶሺ𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻ|𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௕ீሻሿ
െ ൛𝑣ሺ𝑤ଵீሻ
൅ 𝑞ൣ𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଵ𝑣൫𝑤௚ீ൯ ൅ ൫1 െ 𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଵ൯𝐸ଵ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯൧





𝑤௨ீ∗ ൫𝑤ଵீ, 𝑤௚ீ, 𝑤௕ீ൯.  It is immediately apparent that ௗ௪ೠಸ
∗
ௗ௪భಸ ൐ 0. The effects of the harvest stage wages 






𝑑𝑤௚ீ ൌ 𝑞 ቈሺ𝑓ଶ െ 𝑓ଵሻ𝑣൫𝑤௚ீ൯ ൅ 𝑤௚ீሺ𝑓ଶ െ 𝑓ଵሻ𝑣
ᇱ൫𝑤௚ீ൯ െ 𝑓ଶ𝐸ଶ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯
൅ ൫1 െ 𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଶ൯
𝑑𝐸ଶ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯
𝑑𝑤௚ீ ൅ 𝑓ଵ𝐸ଵ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯
െ ൫1 െ 𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଵ൯
𝑑𝐸ଵ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯
𝑑𝑤௚ீ ቉
ൌ 𝑞 ቈሺ𝑓ଶ െ 𝑓ଵሻ𝑣൫𝑤௚ீ൯ ൅ 𝑤௚ீሺ𝑓ଶ െ 𝑓ଵሻ𝑣ᇱ൫𝑤௚ீ൯ െ 𝑓ଶ𝐸ଶ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯
൅ ൫1 െ 𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଶ ൯ 𝑓ଶ1 െ 𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଶ 𝐸ଶ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯ ൅ 𝑓ଵ𝐸ଵ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯
െ ൫1 െ 𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଵ൯ 𝑓ଵ1 െ 𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଵ 𝐸ଵ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯቉
ൌ 𝑞ൣሺ𝑓ଶ െ 𝑓ଵሻ𝑣൫𝑤௚ீ൯ ൅ 𝑤௚ீሺ𝑓ଶ െ 𝑓ଵሻ𝑣ᇱ൫𝑤௚ீ൯ െ 𝑓ଶ𝐸ଶ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯
൅ 𝑓ଶ𝐸ଶ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯ ൅ 𝑓ଵ𝐸ଵ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯ െ 𝑓ଵ𝐸ଵ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯൧
ൌ 𝑞ൣሺ𝑓ଶ െ 𝑓ଵሻ𝑣൫𝑤௚ீ൯ ൅ 𝑤௚ீሺ𝑓ଶ െ 𝑓ଵሻ𝑣ᇱ൫𝑤௚ீ൯൧ ൏ 0 










  𝑣ሺ𝑤ଵீሻ െ 𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ீ∗ ሻ
൏ 𝑞 ቂ𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଶ𝑣൫𝑤௚ீ൯ ൅ ൫1 െ 𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଶ൯𝐸ଵ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯
െ ቀ𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଶ𝑣൫𝑤௚ீ൯ ൅ ൫1 െ 𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଶ൯𝐸ଶ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯ቁቃ
൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑞ሻൣ𝑤௕ீ𝑓ଶ𝑣ሺ𝑤௕ீሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑤௕ீ𝑓ଶሻ𝐸ଵሺ𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻ|𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௕ீሻ
െ ൫𝑤௕ீ𝑓ଶ𝑣ሺ𝑤௕ீሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑤௕ீ𝑓ଶሻ𝐸ଶሺ𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻ|𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௕ீሻ൯൧
൏ 𝑞 ቂ𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଶ𝑣൫𝑤௚ீ൯ ൅ ൫1 െ 𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଶ൯𝐸ଶ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯
െ ቀ𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଶ𝑣൫𝑤௚ீ൯ ൅ ൫1 െ 𝑤௚ீ𝑓ଶ൯𝐸ଶ൫𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻห𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௚ீ൯ቁቃ
൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑞ሻൣ𝑤௕ீ𝑓ଶ𝑣ሺ𝑤௕ீሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑤௕ீ𝑓ଶሻ𝐸ଶሺ𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻ|𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௕ீሻ
െ ൫𝑤௕ீ𝑓ଶ𝑣ሺ𝑤௕ீሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑤௕ீ𝑓ଶሻ𝐸ଶሺ𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻ|𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௕ீሻ൯൧ ൌ 0 
(34) 
 
The first inequality is a consequence of 𝑓ଵ ൐ 𝑓ଶ,  along with 𝐸ሺ𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻ|𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤ሻ ൐ 𝑣ሺ𝑤ሻ. The second 
inequality is a consequence of 𝐸ଶሺ𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻ|𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤ሻ ൐ 𝐸ଵሺ𝑣ሺ𝑤௨ሻ|𝑊௨ ൐ 𝑤ሻ. Analogous reasoning holds 
for 𝐹 ൌ 𝐵.  
Therefore,  




Migration in state s  of the harvest stage is 𝑀௦ி ൌ 1 െ ሺ𝑆ଵ𝑓ଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑆ଵሻ𝑓ଶሻ𝑤௦ி. The supply of labor in 
stage 1 is 𝑆ଵ ൌ 𝑤௨ி∗ ൫𝑤ଵி, 𝑤௚ி, 𝑤௕ி, 𝐹൯𝑓ଵ.  In the harvest stage, the supply of labor is  
5 
 





𝑄௕ி ൌ 𝑥ଵிఉ ሺ1 െ 𝑅ிሻ ൏ 𝑥ଵிఉ 𝜃ሺ1 ൅ 𝑅ிሻ ൌ 𝑄௚ி  
Equilibrium requires that harvest stage labor supply in the good state be larger than harvest stage labor 
supply in the bad state ൫𝑆௚ி ൐ 𝑆௕ி൯. Therefore, 






𝜌𝑥ଵிఉ 𝜃ሺ1 ൅ 𝑅ிሻሺ𝑆ଵ𝑓ଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑆ଵሻ𝑓ଶሻ
𝜌𝑥ଵிఉ ሺ1 െ 𝑅ிሻሺ𝑆ଵ𝑓ଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑆ଵሻ𝑓ଶሻ





In the absence of a safe asset or credit market, the choice of planting stage labor is the primary tool 
for moving resources across stages, while the choice of the riskiness of the technology is the first 
order tool for calibrating risk across harvest stage states of nature. If the technology is such that 
harvest season profits are always (weakly) higher in the good state, then choosing 𝑅ி ൐ 0 implies 
that risk aversion cannot be too strong. Define profit in state 𝑠 of the harvest stage as 𝑄௦ிሺ1 െ 𝑤௦ிሻ ൌ
𝜋௦ி. 
Proposition 1: If 𝜋௚ி ൒ 𝜋௕ி 𝑎𝑡 𝑅ீ ൌ 0  and 𝑅ீ ൐ 𝑅஻ for 𝑞 ∈ ሾ0.5,1ሿ then 𝛾 ൏ 1. 
Proof: 𝜋௚ி ൐ 𝜋௕ி  implies ሺଵିோಸሻሺଵାோಸሻ ൌ 1 ൏
ఏ൫ଵିఘ௪೒ಸ൯
ଵିఘ௪್ಸ   
And 𝑅ீ ൐ 𝑅஻ implies 
ሺ1 െ 𝑅ீሻ




ఊିଵ ൬1 െ 𝑞𝑞 ൰
ଵ
ఊ ൏ ሺ1 െ 𝑅஻ሻሺ1 ൅ 𝑅஻ሻ ൑ 1 
At 𝑞 ൌ ଵଶ, 
ቆ൫1 െ 𝜌𝑤௚ீ൯𝜃ሺ1 െ 𝜌𝑤௕ீሻ ቇ
ଵିଵఊ
൏ 1 ൏ 𝜃൫1 െ 𝜌𝑤௚ீ൯1 െ 𝜌𝑤௕ீ . 
6 
 






൬1 െ 𝜌𝑤௚ி1 െ 𝜌𝑤௕ி൰
ଵିఊ
ൌ 𝜃 ൬ 𝑞ሺ1 െ 𝑞ሻ൰
௃ಷ   (37) 
for 𝐽 ൌ 1 and 𝐽஻ ൌ െ1.  (16) implicitly defines 𝑤௕ி  as a function of 𝑤௚ி. To calculate an equilibrium: 
1. For every 𝑤௚ி, calculate the consistent 𝑤௕ி  from harvest season relative wage equilibrium (16). 
Note that for 𝛾 ൑ 1, 𝑤௕ி൫𝑤௚ி൯ is monotonic and 1 ൐ ௗ௪್ಷௗ௪೒ಷ ൐ 0.  
2. So the problem is to find 𝝎𝑭 ൌ ൫𝑤ଵி, 𝑤௚ி൯ᇱ such that 𝒘ி ൌ ቀ𝑤ଵி, 𝑤௚ி, 𝑤௕ி൫𝑤௚ி൯ቁ
ᇱ solves the 2 
equations:  
  𝑆ଵிሺ𝒘𝑺ிሻ െ 𝑥ிሺ𝒘ிሻ ൌ 𝟎  


















𝑑𝑤௚ி ൏ 0  (39) 
Define  
𝑆௚ி൫𝑤ଵி, 𝑤௚ீ; 𝑞 ൯ ൌ 𝑤௚ிሺ𝑆ଵிሺ𝒘ிሻ𝑓ଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑆ଵிሺ𝒘ிሻሻ𝑓ଶሻ 
So  
𝑑𝑆௚ி




𝑑𝑤ଵி 𝑓ଶ൰ ൌ 𝑤௚ி
𝑑𝑆ଵி





𝑑𝑤௚ி ሺ𝑓ଵ െ 𝑓ଶሻ ൅ ሺ𝑆ଵிሺ𝒘ிሻ𝑓ଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑆ଵிሺ𝒘ிሻሻ𝑓ଶሻ ൐ 0. 
A similar calculation shows ௗௌ೒ಸௗ௤ ൐ 0.  
Define 𝐷௚ிሺ𝑤ଵி, 𝑤௚ீ; 𝑞ሻ ൌ  𝜌𝜃൫1 ൅ 𝑅ிሺ𝒘ிሻ൯ሺ𝑥ிሺ𝒘ிሻሻఉ so 
𝑑𝐷௚ி



































































forecast	of	bad	weather:	𝑀ଵீ ൏ 𝑀ଵ஻ .	 
Planting stage labor market equilibrium requires  
ሺ1 െ 𝑀ଵீሻ ൌ 𝑆ଵீ ൌ 𝑥ଵீ ൐ 𝑥ଵ஻ ൌ 𝑆ଵ஻ ൌ ሺ1 െ 𝑀ଵ஻ሻ. 
Implication 3: The difference in migration in the good state of the harvest stage and in the bad state of 
the harvest stage must be greater after a forecast of good weather: 𝑀௕ீ െ 𝑀௚ீ ൐ 𝑀௕஻ െ 𝑀௚஻. 
𝑅ீ ൒ 𝑅஻ implies ொ೒ಸொ್ಸ ൒
ொ೒ಳ













ሺ1 െ 𝑅ீሻ ൐
𝜃ሺ1 ൅ 𝑅஻ሻ






𝑥ଵீ ൐ 𝑥ଵ஻ and 𝑅ଵீ ൐ 𝑅ଵ஻ imply for the harvest stage labor markets to clear that 
𝑤௚ீሺ𝑥ଵீ𝑓ଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑥ଵீሻ𝑓ଶሻ ൌ 𝜌𝑥ଵீఉ 𝜃ሺ1 ൅ 𝑅ଵீሻ ൐ 𝜌𝑥ଵ஻ఉ 𝜃ሺ1 ൅ 𝑅ଵ஻ሻ
ൌ 𝑤௚஻ሺ𝑥ଵ஻𝑓ଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑥ଵ஻ሻ𝑓ଶሻ ൐ 𝑤௚஻ሺ𝑥ଵீ𝑓ଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑥ଵீሻ𝑓ଶሻ 
because 𝑓ଶ ൏ 𝑓ଵ.  Therefore, 𝑤௚ீ ൐ 𝑤௚஻. 
Wage Floors 
A statutory wage floor at a fixed level 𝑤௠ generated by an employment guarantee scheme implies that 




Proposition 2: Suppose that the equilibrium wage vector is ൫𝑤ଵி∗ , 𝑤௚ி∗ , 𝑤௕ி∗ ൯ ≡ 𝒘𝑭∗  such that 𝒘𝑭∗ ൒ 𝑤௠, 







We need not consider any case in which 𝑤௚ி∗ ൌ 𝑤௠ ൏ 𝑤௕ி∗  because the good state harvest stage labor 
market equilibrium requires  
𝑤௚ி∗ ሺ𝑆ଵிሺ𝒘ி∗ ሻ𝑓ଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑆ଵிሺ𝒘ி∗ ሻሻ𝑓ଶሻ ൒  𝜌𝜃൫1 ൅ 𝑅ிሺ𝒘ி∗ ሻ൯൫𝑥ிሺ𝒘ி∗ ሻ൯ఉ, 
but the bad state harvest stage labor market equilibrium is  
𝑤௕ி∗ ሺ𝑆ଵிሺ𝒘ி∗ ሻ𝑓ଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑆ଵிሺ𝒘ி∗ ሻሻ𝑓ଶሻ ൌ 𝜌൫1 െ 𝑅ிሺ𝒘ி∗ ሻ൯൫𝑥ிሺ𝒘ி∗ ሻ൯ఉ, 




A. The planting  stage rural labor equilibrium holds with equality: 𝐸𝑄ଵிሺ𝒘ி∗ ሻ ൌ 𝑆ଵிሺ𝒘ி∗ ሻ െ




B. The planting stage rural labor equilibrium does not hold with equality ൫𝑤௚ி ൌ 𝑤௠൯but the rural 
labor market equilibrium in the good state does hold with equality:   









𝑑𝑤௠ ൌ െ ൥𝑤௚ி ൭൬
𝜕𝑀ଵி








𝑑𝑤௚ிቇ ሺ𝑓ଶ െ 𝑓ଵሻ



















We show that there exist parameters such that  𝑤ଵி െ 𝑤ଵி∗ ൅ ൫𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏ሺ𝑠 ൌ 𝑔|𝐹ሻ൯ሺ𝑤௚ி െ 𝑤௚ி∗ ሻ ൅




wage floor when 𝑌௖ ൌ 𝑌௟ ൌ 2, 𝛾 ൌ 0.5, 𝑞 ൌ 0.51, 𝛽 ൌ 0.5, 𝜌 ൌ 0.55, 𝜃 ൌ 1.55, 𝑓ଵ ൌ 1.4, 𝑓ଶ ൌ
0.3. At these parameter values, the equilibrium wages without a binding wage floor are 
൫𝑤ଵீ, 𝑤௚ீ, 𝑤௕ீ൯ ൌ ሺ0.87, 1.26, 0.16ሻ and when the wage floor is binding in the bad state the 









wage during planting falls into the range 𝑤∗ீ ൐ 𝑤௨ ൐ 𝑤௕∗. So all of the direct benefits of having a correct 
forecast accrue to the set of people who migrate if the forecast is for bad, and not if the forecast is for 
good, that is, for the fraction 𝑀ଵ஻ െ 𝑀ଵீ . Suppose the weather turned out well. If the forecast 
(correctly) been for good, a worker earns 
 
𝑤ଵீ ൅ ൮𝑓ଵ𝑤௚ீ𝑤௚ீ ൅




𝑤௨ ൅ ൮𝑓ଶ𝑤௚஻𝑤௚஻ ൅




let  𝑤௕ீ ൌ 𝑤௕஻ ൌ 𝑤௕ ൏ 𝑤௚ ൌ 𝑤௚ீ ൌ 𝑤௚஻. The difference in expected returns for correct forecasts from 
incorrect forecasts is 
  1
2 ൦𝑤௨ ൅ ൮𝑓ଶ𝑤௕𝑤௕ ൅
ሺ1 െ 𝑤௕𝑓ଶሻ ൬𝑤௕ ൅ 1𝑓ଶ൰
2 ൲ ൅ 𝑤ଵீ
൅ ൮𝑓ଵ𝑤௚𝑤௚ ൅
൫1 െ 𝑤௚𝑓ଵ൯ ൬𝑤௚ ൅ 1𝑓ଵ൰
2 ൲ െ 𝑤ଵீ
െ ൮𝑓ଵ𝑤௕𝑤௕ ൅
ሺ1 െ 𝑤௕𝑓ଵሻ ൬𝑤௕ ൅ 1𝑓ଵ൰
2 ൲ െ 𝑤௨
െ ൮𝑓ଶ𝑤௚𝑤௚ ൅
൫1 െ 𝑤௚𝑓ଶ൯ ൬𝑤௚ ൅ 1𝑓ଶ൰
2 ൲൪








out 𝑆ଵீ, 𝑥ଵீ, 𝑆௚ீ and 𝐷௚ீ, increasing demand for labor (in both seasons) to (2). The lower harvest season wage at (2) implies a 
lower supply of labor in the planting season ( and a higher demand for labor in the planting season), making the final 
equilibrium at point (3). Different parameter values could have led to a higher harvest season wage at (2), implying a higher
supply of labor in the planting season (and a lower demand for labor in the planting season), resulting in a final equilibrium at 
(3’). In all cases 𝑥ଵீ increases.
